

6 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard M. Service
Department of State

SUBJECT : Paper on Non-Military Pressures on USSR in Berlin Crisis

1. attached, in the form of amendments written into your text for easy reference, are our informal working level comments on the first semi-complete draft of the above paper. We will send over comments on the economic sections when we receive your draft Monday.

2. We note that some of our initial substantive comments of last week were not incorporated in this draft. I urge that you give careful consideration to these new ones; could you let me know which of them you can't accept?

3. In particular, the following should be noted:

a. Conclusions 9 and 10 are misleading and could be much improved. They should also be tied in more explicitly to the military paper. See our proposed redraft.

b. We have redrafted Conclusions 1 and 2 (and expanded them into three) in order to strengthen their impact. One sentence has been added to new Conclusion 2.

c. The introductory four pages are well done but should be reorganized somewhat for clarity and impact. We have attempted a purely editorial redraft pp. 2-5 which alters no substance but improves presentation.

d. In the Section on neutral representations to Moscow, you allude in the third paragraph to representations to both parties, but this contradicts the title. It strikes us that the US might get much better responses from key neutrals if it encouraged them to urge restraint on both sides, though of course the political impact on the USSR would be less. This variant might be worth elaboration; at any rate you should clarify whether you are talking about representations to the USSR alone or to both sides.

e. The Section on Disruptive Activities is generally acceptable (see minor changes in text) as long as the caveat in Conclusion 7, which we like very much, remains as written.

f. We have some changes to propose in the Section on cutting off non-diplomatic contacts to strengthen your negative conclusion.

g. We have several changes to suggest in the two Sections on Breaking Diplomatic Relations with the USSR. These sections must be considered in the context of the other final preparedness measures and consultations covered in the military paper. More also needs to be said on Free World reactions to a unilateral US break. I feel that our proposed changes sharpen up and clarify what you had in mind.

h. Finally, we have suggested a number of small substantive as well as editorial changes, written directly on your text.

R. W. KOWLER